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Next-generation harbor surveillance systems are envisioned to 
tomatically identify potential threats with a high degree of con-
dence [3]. Their objective is obtaining not only tracking informa-
on about vessels, but also an abstract picture of the situation to 
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. Introduction
Maritime security is an area of strategic importance for the
ternational community. As stated in [1], ‘‘a terrorist incident 
gainst a marine transportation system would have a disaster 
pact on global shipping, international trade, and the world 
conomy in addition to the strategic military value of many ports 
nd waterways’’. For that reason, one of the principal goals of 
trengthening maritime security is to ‘‘increase maritime domain 
wareness’’ by building a ‘‘surveillance picture as complete as 
ossible to assess the threats and vulnerabilities in the maritime 
alm’’. In particular, harbor surveillance is a critical part of 
aritime security procedures because of its multiple objectives: 
cognition of terrorist threats, prevention of maritime and ecolog-
al accidents, detection of illegal immigration, ﬁshing and drug 
afﬁcking, and so forth. However, it is nowadays mostly developed 
y human operators [2], who have to evaluate an overwhelming 
mount of information. This makes it very difﬁcult to keep track of ake informed decisions. According to the JDL data fusion model, 
e latter task belongs to the domain of Situation Assessment, de-
ned as the estimation of ‘‘sets of relationships among entities and 
eir implications for the states of the related entities’’ [4]. In this 
omain, it requires understanding the intrinsic information pro-
ided by coastal sensors in the context determined by extrinsic fac-
rs, like harbor environment, operational regulations, trafﬁc data 
nd intelligence reports.
Recently, the increasing interest in higher-level information fu-
ion has led to several proposals for context management – see for 
xample the special sessions on context-based information fusion 
elebrated in the International Conferences on Information Fusion 
ince 2007. Detection and characterization of activities and threats 
quire assessing the states of situational items and their relation-
hips within a speciﬁc context. From the perspective of the fusion 
rocess, context can be informally deﬁned as the set of background 
ircumstances that are not of prime interest to the system, but have 
otential relevance towards optimal estimation [5]. When a 
ontext is activated (i.e., some circumstances hold), more informa-
on is available to obtain and improve estimations on problem 
ntities. This contextual information, expressed in the form of 
omplementary knowledge or constraints, encompasses informa-ween 
es
of the decision makers. Such diversity makes formal context repre-
sentation a signiﬁcant challenge.
Ontologies are an appropriate formalism to represent contex-
tual and factual knowledge in higher-level fusion [6–8]. However, 
ontology languages based on Description Logics, and in particular 
the standard ontology web language (OWL 2) [9], present several 
unsolved challenges when applied to Situation Assessment 
because: (i) they do not allow for reasoning with uncertain knowl-
edge; and (ii) they do not directly support abductive reasoning to 
create and validate situational hypotheses that change in time.
In this paper we describe an Information Fusion system that 
uses contextual knowledge represented with ontologies to detect 
and evaluate anomalous situations. By contextual knowledge we 
mean knowledge about external information that completes, 
inﬂuences or constrains the situations or events of interests; e.g. 
physical characteristics of the environment such as terrain or 
weather, or knowledge about the expected behavior of the objects. 
The architecture of the system is arranged in two processing levels. 
Firstly, the system applies deductive and rule-based reasoning to 
extend tracking data and to classify objects according to their 
features. Secondly, the Belief-Argumentation System (BAS), a logic-
based paradigm for abductive reasoning [10], is used in com-
bination with the Transferable Belief Model (TBM) [11] to deter-
mine the threat level of situations involving objects that are not 
compliant to a normality model. A prototype implementation of 
this system adapted to the harbor surveillance problem is available 
for experimental evaluation at the authors’ web page.1
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst attempt to com-
bine ontologies and TBM-based uncertain reasoning to implement 
multi-level information fusion. Similar approaches in the literature 
have focused on alternative probabilistic models; namely, Multi-
Entity Bayesian Networks [12,13] and Markov Logic Networks [14]. 
Ontologies facilitate the creation of a computable model rep-
resenting complex situational context (problem entities, scenario 
geometry, spatial relationships, etc.), since they can be formally en-
coded in a logic-based expressive language. The examples show 
that this integrated approach reduces the number of false alarms 
with respect to purely ontological proposals through quantifying 
the threat level.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next 
section, we discuss the deﬁnition and the role of context in Infor-
mation Fusion. We also describe the advantages and drawbacks of 
common context representation formalisms, and compare our 
proposal with related works on ontology-based and probabilistic 
Situation Assessment. Section 3 studies the data sources that must 
be taken into account in the harbor surveillance domain, and pre-
sents the overall design of the system. Section 4 analyzes the pro-
cedures for vessel classiﬁcation and abnormal situation detection. 
Section 5 presents a reasoning method based on the BAS for situa-
tion interpretation. Section 6 illustrates the functioning of the 
system in a threat detection scenario. The paper concludes with 
discussions on the contributions of the work and directions for 
future research.2. Context and ontologies in information fusion
2.1. Context deﬁnition and representation
The Webster dictionary deﬁnes context as ‘‘the interrelated 
conditions in which something exists or occurs’’ or ‘‘the parts of a 
discourse that surround a word or passage and can throw light on its 
meaning’’ [15]. The concept of context has been studied in manyhttp://www.giaa.inf.uc3m.es/miembros/jgomez/simulator/
harborSimulator.html.research ﬁelds (see for example [16]). One of the ﬁrst approxima-
tions to the formalization of the notion of context in Artiﬁcial Intel-
ligence is due to McCarthy [17], who proposed the use of the 
relation ist(c, p) to represent that a given proposition p is true in the 
context c. Sowa extended this theory with the dscr(x, p) relation 
[18], which states that p describes entity x. Since x can be a situa-
tion, dscr semantics subsume those of ist. Giunchiglia deﬁnes a 
similar epistemological framework in which a context is a subset of 
the complete state of an entity that is used in reasoning to solve a 
task [19]. It has been proved that these multi-context logics are 
more general than ist-based formalisms [20]. These approaches 
have been investigated to address context modeling with ontolo-
gies in the Semantic Web, which has led to proposals including new 
language constructors [21–23] or annotations with speciﬁc 
semantics [24]. Unfortunately, they are neither widespread nor 
supported by the current version of the standard language OWL 
and associated reasoning engines.
In the Information Fusion community, context has been consid-
ered from different points of view. One of them, which in our opin-
ion is prevalent, is to refer to external knowledge that is useful or 
inﬂuences the fusion processes, including background knowledge 
(e.g. tactics, doctrine), situation-speciﬁc knowledge (e.g. terrain), 
existing reports and databases, and so forth [25,26]. Sycara et al. 
state that part of the context are the signiﬁcant features or the his-
tory of a situation that inﬂuence the features of other situation, as 
well as the expectations on what is to be observed and the inter-
pretation of what has been observed [27]. They also propose the 
HiLIFE (High-Level Information Fusion Environment) fusion model 
for battleﬁeld management. To these authors, situational context is 
a ﬁrst ''class entity'', but not exactly in the sense of McCarthy. In 
their sense, it is rather a computable description of the terrain ele-
ments, the external resources and the possible inferences that is 
essential to support the fusion process. Our work follows the same 
principle. We create a model of the scenario and use background, 
situational and expert knowledge to drive the high-level fusion 
process. The speciﬁc contents of the context model for the harbor 
surveillance problem are described in Section 3. Context can thus 
be used to explain observations, to deﬁne hypotheses, to identify 
areas of interest to focus new data collection, to reﬁne ambiguous 
estimations, and to provide for interrelationship between different 
fusion levels [27,28].
In [29,30], several major types of context models were consid-
ered, of which the three ones most applicable to data fusion can be 
characterized as key-value models, ontology-based models and 
logic-based models. Key-value models are the simplest way of 
representing context. They provide values of context attributes as 
environmental information and utilize exact matching algorithms 
on these attributes. These models may sufﬁce for use in Level 1 
fusion to work with data constraints [31], but they lack capabilities 
for complex context representation required by higher-level fusion. 
Ontology-based models provide a formal way for specifying core 
concepts, sub-concepts, facts and their inter-relationships to enable 
realistic representation of contextual knowledge [6–8]. Current 
approaches to ontology-based context modeling can be classiﬁed 
into three main areas: contextualization of ontologies, ontology 
design patterns, and context-aware systems [32]. Ad hoc logic-
based models can be applied to extend or replace ontologies in 
knowledge-intensive applications. They represent context as facts 
and information inferred from rules. These models are generally 
more expressive, and allow for the development of more sophisti-
cated representations and reasoning procedures.
The complex uncertain harbor surveillance scenario calls for a
hybrid context representation combining ontology and logic-based
models enriched by uncertainty consideration. We propose a
fusion system in which the description of the domain entities, such
as vessel types and harbor areas, the relations between them, and2
applicable regulations are modeled as a certain set of ontological 
concepts, relations, instances, axioms and rules. Deductive reason-
ing is applied to detect inconsistencies between the situations 
obtained as a dynamic instantiation of the scene model and the sit-
uational patterns deﬁned in the normalcy model. Normalcy rules 
are local to a navigational context, which depends in most cases on 
the geographical situation of the vessel (as in [14]). Inconsisten-cies 
denote abnormal situations that may indicate a potential threat. A 
probabilistic reasoning process is then triggered to inves-tigate 
whether these inconsistencies are the result of insufﬁcient quality 
of observations, contextual knowledge, and fusion processes, or the 
result of the change of context; e.g. discovered potential or 
imminent threat.2.2. Ontologies, logic and uncertainty in higher-level fusion
During the last decade, several approaches using ontologies 
have emerged in the higher-level Information Fusion research area. 
The SAW Core ontology represents general concepts used in situa-
tional awareness [33]. It was used as a meta-model in [34], which 
applied deductive reasoning for Situation Assessment in a trafﬁc-
management scenario. The Situation Theory Ontology (STO) has 
been recently proposed as a formal upper model to represent the 
abstract concepts involved in Situation Awareness under the 
semantics of Barwise and Perry’s situation theory [8]. In the harbor 
domain, ontologies have been also used to represent a priori and 
contextual information. In [35], a MDO (Maritime Domain Ontol-
ogy) was created to automatically classify vessels and situations 
from perceived situations by applying deductive reasoning. Simi-
larly, in [36] the authors showed that ontologies are useful to 
capture ancillary knowledge on the elements of the application 
domain and behavioral patterns.
In these works, situation recognition is mostly achieved by in-
stance classiﬁcation as follows. Context models include ontological 
descriptions of categories of entities and situations. When a new 
object is created or its property values are modiﬁed, a deductive 
reasoning process ﬁnds matches to these descriptions and 
determines the class or classes to which the new instance belongs. 
However, this procedure is insufﬁcient in complex Situation 
Assessment problems, because there is an inherent uncertainty in 
this process that is not considered, and more than one hypothesis 
may explain the current situation, but only one is generated. In 
general, ontologies are not suited for abductive inference and rea-
soning under uncertainty [37]. In addition, they are not particularly 
effective to represent perdurants; i.e., entities that change in time. 
This requires the creation of artiﬁcial representational patterns [38] 
or the use of non-standard extensions to the standard languages 
[39]. As introduced in the previous section, we propose a combined 
architecture that extends the typical deductive reason-ing with 
probabilistic abductive reasoning.
The ﬁnal report of the Uncertainty Reasoning for the World 
Wide Web Incubator Group distinguishes the three most common 
approaches to incorporate uncertain, unreliable and imprecise 
knowledge to Web ontologies: Fuzzy Logic, probability theory and 
belief functions [40]. Among them, the former two have been 
considered in Information Fusion. One of the most notable propos-
als is PR-OWL 2, an extension of the OWL language with Bayesian 
probability theory [12], that has been illustrated with examples on 
higher-level fusion in the maritime domain [13,41]. PR-OWL 2 rep-
resents factual and contextual knowledge in terms of instances and 
properties with associated uncertainty. Currently, there are no rea-
soners available that entirely supports this language. However, the 
resulting ontologies can be transformed into a probabilistic net-
work and processed with the UnBBayes2 tool. The main difference2 http://unbbayes.sourceforge.net/.regarding our work is that we do not embed the probabilistic formal-
ism into the ontology. Instead, we use ontologies as a uniﬁed repre-
sentation in a deductive layer to extend data with available
knowledge, and delegate threat assessment tasks to the upper layer
implementing the BAS-based reasoning process. This adds more ﬂex-
ibility to the system and reduces the computational cost that is usu-
ally associated to ontology-based reasoning, which may make the
application unusable under real-time restrictions.
A related proposal is presented in [14]. The authors use Mar-kov 
Logic Networks (MLNs) to represent uncertain context knowl-edge 
and automatically detect anomalies in the maritime domain. MLNs 
combine the expressiveness of ﬁrst order logic and the uncertainty 
management of Markov Networks, thus providing a very intuitive 
and powerful knowledge framework. The treatment of context 
information is very similar as in our approach, since it is 
conveniently integrated into the representation and exploited to 
properly interpret the available data. The paper does not study in 
detail the possible effects of the semi-decidability of ﬁrst order 
logic, which may be a drawback compared to decidable Descrip-
tion Logics ontologies. Besides, they assume that information is 
already available and expressed in a symbolic form, as in [13,41]. It 
is not clear how the raw sensor data is incorporated into the logic 
model, a problem that is explicitly tackled in our architecture.
Building a common framework for the evaluation of probabilis-
tic higher-level Information Fusion systems is a research topic that 
has received considerable attention recently. The Evaluation of 
Techniques for Uncertainty Representation Working Group3
(ETURWG), hosted by the International Society of Information Fusion 
(ISIF), is an ongoing initiative purposely formed in 2011 to address 
this problem. The URREF (Uncertainty Representation and Reasoning 
Evaluation Framework) ontology is an initial proposal towards the 
formal description of the concepts involved in a probabilistic fusion 
system and the applicable comparison criteria [42]. Nevertheless, 
the state of this proposal at the time of this writing makes it still 
unfeasible to carry out a detailed comparison among different 
systems.3. Sensorial and contextual information in the harbor
surveillance scenario
Surveillance picture formation in the harbor scenario is the re-
sult of a multi-level fusion process, which includes:
 Data acquisition from heterogeneous sources about single
objects.
 Object tracking to integrate sensor data and obtain the tracks
(location, kinematics, identiﬁcation) representing all objects
present in the scene.
 Object property estimation for object categorization.
 Utilization of context knowledge about expected object proper-
ties, identiﬁcation, and behavior to classify objects and to infer
basic relationships and situations.
 Matching expected behavior provided by the context of entities
to the observed situation in order to detect a possible anomaly
as an initial step towards scene recognition.
 Abductive reasoning to explain inconsistency, to detect possibly
threat to alert an operator, and to improve the overall function-
ing of the system and the knowledge base.
Input data encompasses hard and soft sources, ranging from
sensor measurements to intelligence reports. Sensor data is auto-3 http://eturwg.c4i.gmu.edu/.
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  matically acquired by primary coastal sensors or cooperatively 
emitted by ships. The main primary-sensor technology for object 
detection and location in the harbor is the coastal radar, which does 
not require cooperative equipment installed onboard of ships. 
Therefore, the low level input of the system is either raw position 
measurements (in a centralized architecture) or fused estimates 
obtained by a processing node (in a decentralized architecture). In 
both cases, the fusion node involves three basic functions: (i) data 
alignment or common referencing involving coordinate or units 
transformations, uncertainty normalization, and inter-sensor 
alignment; (ii) data association to determine to which entity mea-
surements are associated to; and (iii) state estimation involving the 
computation of entity attributes at Level 1 – e.g., location, velocity, 
and other classiﬁcation attributes such as size or category. Ships 
also emit identiﬁcation data according to IMO (International 
Maritime Organization) security protocols, mainly Automatic Iden-
tiﬁcation System (AIS) data. The AIS system broadcasts basic data 
obtained by the available navigation equipment (identiﬁcation, po-
sition, course, and speed) together with extended data (intended 
route, cargo description, etc.) Other relevant data sources are Ves-
sel Trafﬁc Systems (VTS), which usually collect all available inputs 
in an integrated tracking image [43], and Port Trafﬁc Management 
Systems (PTMS) [44].
We will assume a pre-existing decentralized tracking schema 
with a working fusion node located after a set of single-source tar-
get tracking systems. This schema provides vessel tracks with rea-
sonable accuracy already available to be processed. The 
decentralized solution is more realistic in the maritime surveil-
lance scenario, since it allows using available legacy tracking sys-
tems and taking into account the very different data types and 
update rates of AIS and VTS. The tracking sub-system could also 
beneﬁt from the available context information. For instance, ships 
trajectories might be constrained to follow the assigned channels 
according to deep draught category and water depth. A dynamic 
model for vessel track prediction can be used to incorporate this 
knowledge into the tracker. The tracker includes a ﬁlter for each 
type of target, while the selection of the appropriate model for each 
target according to its context is managed by a context-sensitive 
interacting multiple model (IMM) ﬁlter [45]. A detailed study of the 
use of IMMs is out of the scope of this paper.
In previous works, authors have considered two complemen-
tary dimensions of context knowledge that are relevant to charac-
terize an entity X [29,46]: in the Context of X (CO) and Context for X 
(CF). CO encompasses the sets of situations or events that form the 
environment itself; e.g., the context of normal operations in the 
harbor (all the rules deﬁned by port authorities are obeyed). It de-
ﬁnes expectations about the entities, and may be used to predict 
observations or to trigger abductive reasoning in case of deviations. 
On the other hand, CF deﬁnes the items externally related to and 
referenced by X. In the harbor surveillance domain, it includesTable 1
Contextual information sources in the harbor surveillance scenario.
Static context knowledge
Ships characteristics and behavior restrictions, such as speed and functions
Geographic knowledge with environmental maps: harbor conﬁguration, coastline, cu
Navigation knowledge describing how vessels maneuver as they progress along ship
Sensor characteristics: areas of poor radar coverage, presence of clutter regions
Operational rules about coordinated motion of several vessels; e.g., mandatory use o
mooring position
Allowed proximity to other vessels, protocols for collision avoidance, and rules of pre
Information on intended vessel trajectory: sailing plan or pre-established route, estim
Dynamic context knowledge
Environmental parameters: modiﬁcations of channel navigation restrictions, allowed
Sea conditions, iceextraneous characteristics such as the weather, time of day, harbor 
geometry, and buildings. Table 1 describes some elements of static
–a priori, or conﬁguration data– and dynamic –a posteriori, or infor-
mation inferred at the same time as sensor data is obtained– con-
textual information of interest.
Fig. 1 depicts the processing layers for dynamic surveillance 
picture formation. Firstly, tracking and object identiﬁcation data is 
fused to obtain track features and used to update the scene mod-el. 
In this layer, the scene ontology deﬁnes the concepts and rela-tions 
of the surveillance problem. Concepts are represented by ontology 
classes, whereas relations are represented by ontology properties. 
Accordingly, tracked entities are asserted into the mod-el as class 
instances. Spatial relations among vessels and other ele-ments in 
the scene (harbor channels, mooring positions, constrained areas, 
etc.) are also calculated at this point. Purposely, topological 
reasoning is performed to detect and update qualitative topological 
relations. This procedure is explained in Section 4.1.
Once sensor information is symbolically represented in the 
scene ontology, a classiﬁcation procedure is performed to deter-
mine the type of the vessels according to their features and their 
topological properties. Here we use ‘type’ in a wide sense, since the 
output of this process are statements describing vessels by their 
features (size, ﬂag, function, etc.) and behaviors (stopped, 
exceeding channel speed, too close to other object, etc.) Next, con-
textual information together with all available transient informa-
tion is used to classify the situations as expected or not for each 
object or group of objects. That is, the behavior of estimated situa-
tional items is compared with the corresponding expected behav-
ior in the context under consideration. This procedure is explained 
in Section 4.2.
When the estimated situational items are different from ex-
pected, it is necessary to understand the source of this discrepancy. 
The difference can be attributed to the poor quality of the observa-
tions and the limitations of the tracking process (e.g., sensor noise, 
bad resolution, continuity problems, and association errors), the 
use of imperfect or erroneous knowledge, or the existence of a real 
threat. To make a distinction, the system triggers the abductive 
reasoning process aimed at explaining the source of inconsistency 
and assessing the possible threats (Section 5).
4. Detection of normal situations
The procedure of deviation detection from the normalcy model
is performed in several steps, as explained before. In this section, 
we present a context model for vessel objects based on an ontology
encoded in the Ontology Web Language 2 (OWL 2) [9]. We also de-
scribe the reasoning procedures that are applied for vessel classiﬁ-
cation and expected situation detection based on rules expressed 
in the Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL) rules –the de facto
standard for rule-based reasoning with OWL ontologies [47]. Inrrents, channel navigability, restrictions, etc.
ping channels, meet other vessels, and encounter different weather
f tug boats to escort the cargo ships from the inner port entrance until the ﬁnal
cedence
ated times of arrival, etc.
areas depending on time of day, etc.
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Fig. 1. Workﬂow of the multi-level fusion system in the harbor domain.addition, we detail the procedure to encode and instantiate the
topological predicates.4.1. Representation of vessel characteristics and harbor areas
Vessels are represented as instances of the ontological model.
Most vessel properties, such as speed and position are transient;
i.e., they change during the existence of the vessel object. To repre-
sent these changes in the ontology, we need to associate vessel 
snapshots to vessel instances. A snapshot groups a set of property 
values that are valid in a limited time period. More details of the 
ontological representation of these entities can be found in [48]. 
For the sake of simplicity, in the remaining sections we will assume 
that transient properties are directly assigned to vessel instances 
without using snapshots.
Geographic knowledge of the harbor can be represented at dif-
ferent levels of granularity. Typically, there are two different areasFig. 2. Representation of harborin a harbor: the land area including inner water, which is the port,
and the outer water area, which is called the road. No ship can en-
ter in the port without the permission of Harbor Master’s Ofﬁce
after reporting requested details such as identiﬁcation code,
nationality, length, draught, cargo, and so forth. The anchorage is
the designated area on water where ships wait for the entrance
to the port. Inside the port, we can identify different facilities used
for ship mooring and berthing. Harbor authorities deﬁne naviga-
tion areas for different categories of vessels, e.g. separated chan-
nels for small power-driven vessels, big power-driven vessels and
non-power vessels. In addition, navigation near to certain facilities
may be restricted or even forbidden.
Fig. 2 shows an excerpt of the ontology representing a scenario 
with a vessel, two navigation channels and a restricted facility. At a 
basic level, zones are manually described by means of the global 
coordinates of their delimiting polygon. Vessel location, in turn, 
is represented with a punctual position estimation resulting from 
fusing radar and AIS information. At a higher level of abstraction,zones, facilities and vessels.
5
vessel relative positions with respect to zones, as well as zone rel-
ative positions with respect to other zones, are represented
through qualitative properties that relate different entities, rather
than entities and data values.
The Region Connection Calculus (RCC) is a logic theory for qual-
itative spatial knowledge representation and reasoning [49]. RCC is 
an axiomatization in ﬁrst order logic of certain spatial concepts and 
relations: partially overlaps (po), proper part (pp), inverse of prop-
er part (ppi), and so forth. RCC semantics cannot be fully repre-
sented with ontologies [50], but typical reasoning engines provide 
support for them through an extended processing layer. Additional 
abstract spatial relations are deﬁned inside the scene model; e.g., 
close to (between vessels or vessels and facilities) and aligned to 
(between vessels and channel navigation direction).
These relations require some geometrical calculations to be 
instantiated. For example, it is necessary to determine if the dis-
tance between two entities is less than a threshold in order to 
instantiate the property close to. This process is performed by the 
topological reasoning module. For the implementation of this mod-
ule, we have used the OpenGIS standard and the Java Topology 
Suite,4 a programming library to calculate geometrical relations be-
tween positioned entities. It is important to notice that in a ﬁrst 
‘brute force’ approach, topological relations are calculated between 
each pair of entities when one of them is updated. This requires a 
considerable amount of computations, and necessarily calls for the 
implementation of optimized geometric models able to segment 
the space in inﬂuence zones, in such a way that the number of prop-
erty calculations would be dramatically reduced [51].4.2. Reasoning for vessel classiﬁcation and expected situation detection
Ontologies provide strong support for deductive reasoning, de-
ﬁned as an automatic procedure aimed at inferring new implicit 
axioms that have not been represented but are entailed by the ex-
plicit axioms. Basic ontological reasoning is concerned with the 
inference of subsumption axioms (i.e., determining the implicit 
taxonomy according to asserted classes features) and instance 
membership axioms (i.e., determining the type of an instance 
according to asserted classes and individual features). Reasoning 
algorithms are implemented by inference engines like Pellet [52], 
the one used in our prototype.
Instance membership inference is used to classify vessel in-
stances. For example, we can deﬁne a class for small boats to in-
clude all ships that have a length less than or equal to 15 m. To do 
so, an equivalence axiom is used. If a new vessel instance is as-
serted into the ontology with length 10 m, or the length property 
value of an existing vessel instance changes to a compliant value, 
the vessel is automatically inferred as a member of the small boat 
class. Accordingly, the boat detected in Fig. 2 would be classiﬁed as 
a small boat. We show a few example class deﬁnitions to classify 
vessels in Section 6.2.
Context knowledge is included not only to classify vessel types,
but also to represent and reason with the harbor regulations that
determine whether a vessel is exhibiting a normal behavior. This
is the normalcy model of the harbor: a collection of rules that
are used to classify vessel behavior as compliant to the navigation
rules or not. The model characterizes predictable behaviors accord-
ing to harbor rules, rather than describing the features of an attack,
since the complete enumeration of such unexpected events is, by
deﬁnition, incomplete. The open world assumption, which stands
when reasoning with ontologies, favors this kind of representation.
This assumption states that, by principle, the set of axioms in the4 http://www.vividsolutions.com/jts/.knowledge base is not complete, and therefore, new knowledge
cannot be inferred inductively. In practice, that means that an ax-
iom that is not entailed by the model is not inferred as false, but as
unknown. For instance, according to the previous example, if a ves-
sel instance has a length larger than 15 m, trivially the reasoner
would not conclude that it is a small vessel. Nevertheless, it would
not conclude that the small vessel assertion is false, because there
is not enough knowledge to conﬁrm the latter inference. But notice
that, if other assertions lead to classify this instance as a small ves-
sel, then the ontology would be inconsistent.
The normalcy model includes not only the description of ‘‘good’’, 
expected, behaviors (positive information/vessels musts) but also 
the description of situations that obviously break the har-bor rules 
(negative information/vessel prohibitions). The former are useful to 
directly include harbor rules into the model (compliance 
conditions), whereas the latter allows the inference system to 
check the existence of predeﬁned suspicious or threatening behav-
iors (violation conditions). This is made to improve system perfor-
mance, because selected situations are directly classiﬁed as 
abnormal, and to facilitate modeling, because in some cases it is 
easier to express a harbor navigation rule by presenting the cases 
that are not compliant to it. In any case, as mentioned, vessel 
behavior can be classiﬁed only if there is enough evidence accord-
ing to its properties. Among classiﬁed behaviors, we have vessels 
that are: (i) compliant to harbor rules, (ii) not compliant to harbor 
rules, or (iii) compliant to some harbor rules and not compliant to 
some harbor rules. In Section 6.2 we show an excerpt of the hier-
archy of expected situations of the example.
Harbor rules are expressed in the normalcy model with class 
inclusion axioms and rules. Class inclusion axioms can be used to 
describe under which circumstances a vessel is included in the 
compliant/not compliant behavior classes, in a similar way as it is 
done for vessel classiﬁcation from properties. More interestingly, 
SWRL rules generalize class inclusion axioms by allowing the use of 
bounded variables in the antecedent and the consequent of the 
rule. SWRL supports deductive inference with OWL ontologies 
under certain safety restrictions to guarantee decidability of the 
representation [53]. Essentially, the safety restrictions limit the use 
of variables in rules to pre-existing named entities. This forbids 
adding new factual knowledge (i.e., creating new instances) during 
reasoning, which also implies that scene interpretation through 
abductive reasoning is not directly supported. We use SWRL rules 
to classify vessels behavior according to the harbor navigation 
rules. This gives an initial description of the scene in terms of the 
expected situations detected. For example, we can deﬁne a rule to 
state that a vessel aligned to its enclosing navigation area is sat-
isfying the navigation direction requirements of the harbor. Note 
that harbor restrictions can be easily modeled by using the con-
cepts deﬁned in the ontology as an abstract vocabulary.
If we consider the processing architecture shown in Fig. 1 and 
the ship depicted in Fig. 2, the workﬂow for object classiﬁcation 
and situation deduction is as follows. First, the topological reason-
ing module detects that the ship is inside a navigation channel, and 
consequently instantiates the property inside of. The topological 
module also detects that the ship is aligned to the enclosing zone(s) 
and instantiates the relation aligned to. Next, the corre-sponding 
rule is ﬁred and the behavior of the ship is automatically classiﬁed 
as compliant to the harbor rules. If it were non-compli-ant, this 
information would be provided to the uncertainty module for the 
construction of threat beliefs.5. Hypothesis evaluation for situation and threat assessment
As it was described in the previous section, knowledge of the
harbor describing objects, their properties, and behavior is used
to deﬁne the expected surveillance picture. Detected deviation6
from the normal surveillance picture may have several possible
explanations, or underlying causes. It can be the result of insufﬁ-
cient quality of Level 1 estimations; e.g. inaccurate and unreliable
tracking. It can be also caused by utilization of the wrong environ-
mental conditions –wrong CF– in processing sensor information
(e.g. failure to correctly take into account fog in computing sensor
reliability), or by employment of a certain type of sensors (e.g. a
night vision sensor during day time) leading to incorrect classiﬁca-
tion of the objects and their behavior (such as noisy estimation of
heading, and wrong vessel category) The deviation may be as well
a consequence of poorly estimated or described characteristics of
the current situation, or underlying change in the current situation
–change in CF. These cases can happen as a result of possible ter-
rorist or pirate threat leading to the change of the global harbor 
procedures and constraints. Therefore, it is important to detect 
and understand the cause of anomaly to alert the operator and trig-
ger an appropriate response. This abductive process of inferring the 
cause as an explanation of the effect encompasses the creation of 
hypotheses to explain the state of the world, the computation of 
the credibility of these hypotheses, and the selection of the most 
credible hypotheses [54,55]. The hypothesis evaluation process 
needs to consider: (1) to what extent the selected hypothesis is 
better than the alternatives; (2) how credible the hypothesis is, 
without regarding the alternatives; and (3) the quality of incoming 
data and information on objects and their behavior, which requires 
explanations.
Let Ht ¼ fht1; . . . ; htKg be the set of hypotheses that are consid-
ered at the time instant t. Since we assume that anomaly can be
the result of the insufﬁcient quality (reliability, uncertainty) of
the information on vessels and their behavior, this set of hypothe-
ses includes a hypothesis representing ‘‘normal operations’’. The
set of hypotheses Ht ¼ fht1; . . . ; htKg may not be exhaustive, since
not all the causes of anomaly may be included in the frame of dis-
cernment and some of them can be unknown or even unimagin-
able (open world assumption). This means that plausibility of an
unknown hypothesis can be different to zero.
There are two major types of models of reasoning under uncer-
tainty: graphical models, such as Bayesian and causal networks 
(see, e.g. [56,57]), and logic-based models. Since normal situation 
is based on context of normal operations expressed in rules, we se-
lect here a logic-based model. One of the logic-based paradigms 
that can be considered for abductive reasoning under uncertainty 
is the Belief-based Argumentation System (BAS),5 a generalization 
of the Probabilistic Argumentation System (PAS). Following [58], 
we describe PAS as a hybrid approach that combines logic and prob-
ability theory. It aims at assessing hypothesis about present or future 
worlds by relying on available uncertain, unreliable, incomplete and 
contradictory knowledge. Logic represents the qualitative part of 
PAS. It is applied to determine arguments that support (i.e., in favor) 
and refute (i.e., against) each hypothesis. An argument is a conjunc-
tion of propositions and uncertain assumptions coupled with a priori 
probabilities of their trueness that make a hypothesis true or false. 
The probabilities that the arguments are valid are combined to ob-
tain the quantitative judgment on the validity of the hypothesis, 
which is then used to decide whether it can be accepted, rejected, 
or knowledge is not available to make an appropriate judgment at 
this time.
Precise knowledge of a priori probabilities for assumptions is
hardly available in the uncertain dynamic maritime environment,
in which different and even unimaginable behaviors (types of
threat) can occur. Therefore, they have to be replaced by dynamic
subjective beliefs. Moreover, PðAÞ –additive subjective belief that5 The formal description of the Belief-based Argumentation System below follows 
the explanation introduced in [10].assumption A is true based on expert subjective opinion– is not 
generally 1  P(A), because of this high uncertainty. Consequently, 
PAS needs to employ sub-additive subjective belief measures of the 
form BelðAÞ þ Belð:AÞ   1. This sub-additive property makes it 
pos-sible to explicitly express ignorance, and does not force one to 
re-duce total uncertainty to the assumption that all the hypotheses 
under consideration are equally probable. Thus the belief theories 
allow for representing only our actual knowledge ‘‘without being 
forced to overcommit when we are ignorant’’ [59].
In addition, the open world assumption, in which Bel(£) may 
not be equal to zero, also requires an uncertainty representation 
allowing a non-exhaustive set of hypothesis, which calls for the 
Transferable Belief Theory [11] as an uncertainty framework in BAS. 
The dynamic beliefs assigned to the assumptions are based on 
current context and observations. The beliefs are approximated by 
a function of the estimated values of attributes and relation-ships 
characterizing the situation and related to the assumptions, or 
deﬁned by linguistic labels (low, medium, high) with quantiza-tion 
of these values.
Formally, let H ¼ fh1; . . . ; hKg be a set of hypotheses under con-
sideration. Belð;Þ – 0 because, according to the open world
assumption, this set of hypothesis is not exhaustive. BAS is a tuple
ðA; P; n;BÞ; in which, as in PAS, A ¼ fajg is a set of uncertain
assumptions, P ¼ fpig is the set of propositions, and n 2 LP[A is a
knowledge base representing a set of rules. At the same time, un-
like to PAS, B ¼ fbeljg are non-additive dynamic beliefs associated
with A ¼ fajg. Arguments Argkm supporting (or refuting) each
hypothesis hk are derived from the knowledge base, and are a con-
junction of propositions and assumptions for which hk becomes
true (or false): ArgnðhkÞ ¼
j^
anj k^
pnk . The support of each hypothesis
hk is deﬁned as the disjunction of all minimal arguments support-
ing hk: ArgðhkÞ ¼ _
n
ArgPn _m ArgCm, where _n ArgPn is a disjunction of
all arguments supporting hypothesis hk, and _
m
ArgCm is a disjunc-
tion of all arguments refuting hypothesis hk.
Beliefs in support of each hypothesis hk can be computed by uti-
lizing beliefs in arguments in the following way. Beliefs in support
of and against of each assumption anj invoke support functions on a
frame of discernment Xnj ¼ fT; Fg, which have a single focal ele-
ment (assumption i is true or false). Let us consider a mapping
M : Xn1  . . . XnN ! H. Then, a simple support function lk with
focus h1 in support of argument ArgPn is:
lArgPn ðhkÞ ¼
Y
ArgPn ¼^
j
anj
bpaanj ðTÞ; lArgPnðHÞ ¼ 1lArgPnðhkÞ: ð1Þ
Analogously, the sum of the support functions over the set
fXmj j j^ amj ¼ ArgCm;8mg can be directly mapped into a support
function mj:
mArgCm ðhkÞ ¼
Y
ArgCm ¼^
j
amj
bpaamj ðFÞ; mArgCm ðHÞ ¼ 1mArgCm ðhkÞ: ð2Þ
Accordingly, arguments for and against each hypothesis are
used to compute hypothesis belief as a combination of lk and mj
for all k and j with the unnormalized Dempster rule. This result
is used for decision state estimation.
As it was mentioned before, the process of hypothesis selection 
requires consideration of decision quality, which has to be evalu-
ated against time required for additional observations/computa-
tions. In addition, decision process on any hypothesis under 
consideration has to take into account that something totally unex-
pected and not included in the possible causes of the observed sit-
uational elements can happen.The decision rule considered is the 
following [10]:7
Fig. 3. Scenario harbor zones (zones used in the example are highlighted). If Beltð;Þ  maxðBeltðAÞÞ; 8A#H (i.e., the level of support
for an unknown hypothesis exceeds the level of support
for any hypothesis under consideration), then the expert
operator is alerted to reassess the considered hypotheses
set. Additionally, a sensor management process can be
started to verify and improve the incoming information.
 Otherwise,
– If BeltðHÞ maxðBeltðAÞÞ; 8A#H (i.e., the level of ignorance
exceeds beliefs in any hypothesis), then wait until addi-
tional information arrives at the next time step.
– If BetPtðhkÞ  thðtÞBetPtðhnÞ 8n–k then select hk, otherwise
wait.
BetPt ðhkÞ is the pignistic probability6 of hypothesis hk at time t 
[10]; th(t) is a threshold varying in time that can be modeled by a 
context-speciﬁc decreasing convex function that is set to zero after a 
certain value.
In the harbor surveillance problem, the task of hypothesis eval-
uation is based on the analysis of:
 Vessel features (speed, direction, type, ﬂag, etc.).
 Spatio-temporal relations between the vessels or relations
between the boat and harbor zones.
 Beliefs assigned to assumptions based on the observed spatio-
temporal relations and correspondence of the boat behavior to
rules and regulations as well as quality of transient information.
For example, we can consider the following argument pro
hypothesis ‘‘threat’’ from a boat: a boat is too close to a big vessel
‘and’ the big vessel is a tanker ‘and’ the boat is increasing its
speed’’. Thus this argument is a conjunction of three assumptions:
(1) A boat is too close to a big vessel.
(2) The boat is increasing its speed.
(3) The big vessel is a tanker.
In our use case, belief measures can be modeled as functions of
boat dynamics (increased speed), type of the vessel (a tanker), and
the relation ‘‘close’’ between the boat and a tanker. Thus, the belief
in ‘‘too close’’ can be measured as a function of the difference be-
tween the observed and allowed distance between the tanker
and the boat; and the accuracy and reliability of the distance ob-
served. The next section illustrates this approach in detail.
6. Example: Trafﬁc surveillance in a harbor scenario
6.1. Description of the scenario
The case study considers a frame of discernment with two
hypothesesH ¼ fh1; h2g corresponding to ‘‘threat’’ and ‘‘no threat’’,
which are evaluated for each entity in the scenario. It has been
built from available descriptions of regular operations in real har-
bors and the associated trafﬁc regulations of daily activities.7 This
frame entails a simpliﬁcation of the complete procedure explained
in the previous section, because the number of hypothesis is reduced
and we do not consider the hypothesis selection procedure. Hence,
in the reminder of this section we will not refer to it as abduction,
but just as threat detection.
Context information includes the geometry of the harbor navi-
gation channels, the rules and restrictions related to the normal
navigation patterns, and the special navigation procedures allowed6 The term pignistic was coined by C.A.B. Smith [60] from pignus –a bet in Latin– to 
deﬁne a probability function constructed from a belief function for decision-making.
7 
http://www.portgdansk.pl/events/vts-gulf-of-gdansk,  http://www.victoriaharbor.org  in these channels. In particular, it includes special navigation pro-
cedures within inner harbor requiring the use of towing boats for 
certain size and cargo category of commercial vessels. The scenario 
considers four different kinds of channels (Fig. 3): special container 
channels (SC) for ships with special cargos that must be towed; 
harbor ship channels (HS) for serving boats; general cargo ship 
channels (GC) used for transportation purposes; and small boats 
channels (SB), used by recreational boats and ferries. Each channel 
is denoted by two letters representing its type, and one or more 
letters to specify the allowed navigation directions (N, S, E, W). 
In addition, the harbor also includes a restricted navigation area 
next to the SCE1 channel in the surroundings of a liquid fuel termi-
nal (LFT). The operation rules considered are described in Table 2.6.2. Context, assumptions, arguments and beliefs
A simple OWL ontology has been developed with the Protégé 48
editor including the classes, properties, axioms and rules necessary 
for the example. It comprises 32 classes (16 of them for vessel clas-
siﬁcation purposes) and 30 properties (10 of them are topological 
predicates). Table 3 shows two class deﬁnitions used for classiﬁca-
tion of small boats and large power driven vessels. In addition, the 
ontology includes deﬁnitions for expected situations, corresponding 
to behaviors compliant and non-compliant to navigation rules. Fig. 4 
shows an excerpt of the taxonomy of consistent behaviors and safety 
violations.
Table 4 describes the rules that deﬁne the assumptions and the 
arguments used to check the normalcy model of the scenario. Some 
of these rules are based on predicates that are instantiated by the 
topological reasoning module. For example, in rule 2 the normalcy 
model classiﬁes a ship as a SPEEDVIOLATION instance since it is faster 
than the maximum speed allowed for the area in which it is cur-
rently moving. In our experiments, we have considered four types 
of arguments related to: violations of speed limit, violations of nav-
igation direction, incorrect towing operations, and violation of pro-
tected facilities. For the sake of simplicity, all the arguments 
considered in the example are pro hypothesis ‘‘threat’’. The de-
tected abnormal behavior at time ti triggers reasoning aimed at 
explaining inconsistency and deciding whether this inconsistency 
points to a threatening behavior.
In the case of speed limit, the argument pro hypothesis ‘‘threat’’
(Arg1) is based on detected speed violation and represented by a8 http://protege.stanford.edu.
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Table 2
Example harbor regulations.
Speed limits
General cargo channel 15 knots for all ships
Special containers channel 10 knots for all ships
Small boats channel 12 knots for all ships
Harbor ships channel 20 knots for surveillance ships
15 knots for other ships
Alignment
North (N) 90
South (S) 270
East (E) 0
West (W) 180
Ships in crossing areas should be aligned at least with one of the directions
Towage
Ships of 70 m and more in length, carrying dangerous cargo, shall be obliged
to use tug service while entering the port (from the road to mooring
position at the port), while leaving the port (from unmooring to the road),
and at every change of berth within the port area. Speciﬁcally, 2 tugs are
required for:
 Ships of length over 170 m
 Ships and ﬂoating facilities without propulsion of length over 130 m
 Special ships of length over 150 m
Tug boats must be into the towing perimeter of the assisted ships and aligned
while towing
Table 3
Deﬁnition of ontology classes to classify vessels according to detected properties.
Properties Vessel type
A VESSEL AND (LENGTH SOME SMALLBOAT
(LENGTH AND (LEN SOME DOUBLE[<=15])))
B VESSEL AND (LENGTH SOME LARGEPOWERDRIVENVESSEL
(LENGTH AND (LEN SOME DOUBLE[<=170])))
Fig. 4. Excerpt of consistent behaviors and safety violations in the ontology.conjunction of two uncertain assumptions (A11 and A12) and a
proposition (P1):
Arg1 ¼ A11 ^ A12 ^ P1
where A11 is the boat is inside area X, A12 is the speed of the vessel
is greater than Y, and P1 is The speed limit in X is Y.
Beliefs in the arguments are calculated by combining beliefs
that the assumptions are true. We consider hypotheses
X ¼ fTAl; FAlg, where Tl is a hypothesis that assumption l is true
and Fl is a hypothesis that assumption l is not true. The measures
of belief for each assumption are modeled as follows.bpa for assumptions A11 and A12 in Arg1 are computed as
follows:
 For A11:
bpaðTAl1Þ ¼ expðkA11  jDOWjÞ;
bpaðFA11Þ ¼ 0;
bpaðXÞ ¼ 1 bpaðTA11Þ; ð3Þwhere
– DO ¼ dleft þ dright .
– dleft ; dright are observed distances to the left and right bound
of the channel.
– W is the width of the channel.
 For A12:
bpaðTA12Þ ¼ 1 expðkA12  jOV MV jÞ;
bpaðFA12Þ ¼ 0;
bpaðXÞ ¼ 1 bpaðTA12Þ; ð4Þwhere OV ; MV are the observed and maximum boat speeds, respec-
tively (kl 2 ð0;1Þ are parameters, l = 11,12).
Tug boats and vessels must be aligned to the channels in which
they are into. An alignment violation may indicate threat. For in-
stance, for a boat moving within SCW1, the argument in support
of normal operations Arg2 is based on correct alignment, and is
represented by conjunction of two uncertain assumptions
(A21,A22):
Arg2 ¼ A21 ^ A22
where A21 is the boat is in SCW1, A22 is the boat is going in the
right direction
The belief that these assumptions are true is computed based on
features representing the position and direction of the movement,
which are obtained from tracking and the allowed navigation
directions. For example, bpa for A22 can be computed as a function
of the differences between observed and allowed angles:
 bpa that the boat is going in the right direction is deﬁned as
follows:
bpa1ðTA22Þ ¼
1þ cosðuÞ
2
v122;
bpa1ðFA22Þ ¼ 0;
bpa1ðXÞ ¼ 1 bpa1ðTA22Þ: ð5Þ
where / is the angle between the observed and allowed directions
 bpa that the boat is moving in the opposite direction is deﬁned
as follows:bpa2ðFA22Þ ¼
1 cosð/Þ
2
v222;
bpa2ðFA22Þ ¼ 0;
bpa2ðXÞ ¼ 1 bpa2ðTA22Þ: ð6Þ9
Table 4
Deﬁnition of ontology rules to classify vessels behavior according to expected situations.
Assumptions and arguments
1 Ship navigation angle is not compliant to the one of the including area or channel
VESSEL(?X), NAVIGATIONDIRECTIONCOMPLIANCE(?X)
ALIGNEDTO(?X, ?A), INSIDEOF(?X, ?A)
2 Ship speed is faster than the maximum speed allowed for the including area
AREA(?A), VESSEL(?X), SPEEDVIOLATION(?X)
SPEED(?X, ?S), MOD(?S, ?VS),
INSIDEOF(?X, ?A), MOD(?A, ?VA),
GREATERTHAN(?VS?VA)
3 Perimeter violation of a secured facility
DANGEROUSFACILITY(?F), VESSEL(?X), CLOSETOFACILITY(?X,?F) FACILITYPERIMETERVIOLATION(?X)
4 Large power driven vessels must be towed by a predeﬁned number of boats
LARGEPOWERDRIVENVESSEL(?X), TOWINGNUMBERVIOLATION(?X)
CURRENTTOWINGBOATNUMBER(?X,?Z), RECOMMENDEDTOWBOATNUMBER(?X,?Y),
NUM(?Y,?A), NUM(?Z,?B),
NOTEQUAL(?A,?B)
5 A vessel is being towed by two boats, but they are not correctly aligned for this operation
VESSEL(?X), VESSEL(?Y), VESSEL(?Z), ISTOWEDBY(?Z,?X), ISTOWEDBY(?Z,?Y), TOWINGALIGNMENTVIOLATION(?X), TOWINGALIGNMENTVIOLATION(?Y)
NONALIGNEDTOTOW(?X,?Y)
Fig. 5. Simulated trajectories and behaviors in the harbor scenario.(v122; v222 are the scaling parameters for this bpa)
Another argument pro ‘‘threat’’ is based on the number of ob-
served boats within a required towing distance from a vessel under
consideration, and the type of the vessel deﬁning the number of
towing boats required. For a vessel type requiring two tug boats,
the argument Arg3 pro ‘‘threat’’ (‘‘the number of towing boats is
not the allowed one’’) is a conjunction of the following assumptions:
A31: Tug boat 1 is within the prescribed distance for a tug boat.
A32: Tug boat 2 is within the prescribed distance for a tug boat.
A33: Tug boat 3 is within the prescribed distance for a tug boat.A34: The vessel requires 2 tug boats.
The belief in the argument is a combination of beliefs that there 
are 3 boats detected within the prescribed towing distance, and be-
liefs in the number of allowed boats, which comes from credibility 
of vessel ID recognition based on vessel characteristics. Beliefs that 
boats are within the towing distance is computed by an expression 
similar to Eq. (4).
We also consider Arg4 related to the rules of towing operations;
speciﬁcally, ‘‘alignment of the towing boats is not correct’’. It is a
conjunction of three assumptions based on the alignment of the10
boats. The beliefs on the assumptions are computed with expres-
sions similar to Eqs. (5) and (6). Arg5, in turn, is a pro ‘‘threat’’ argu-
ment based on the fact that one of the boats is breaking a security 
perimeter. It is a conjunction of an assumption A51 and a proposi-
tion P5:
A51: Boat is close to restricted access facility.
P5: The facility perimeter must be protected.
The bpa for A51 is a function of the distance between the boat 
and the secured facility. We have used an equation similar to Eq.
(4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
 
 
 
 
’ 
Fig. 7. Dynamics of belief in Arg2 (alignment to channel navigation directions).6.3. Results
This subsection shows simulation results on the scenario de-
picted in Fig. 3. In the simulation, three tug boats (s1, s2 and s3) 
seem to be towing a power-driven vessel (s4) of length 180 m. The 
operation is carried out from the south of the GCN channel to the 
dock at the end of the SCW1 channel. Harbor rules state that s4 only 
requires 2 tug boats, but in the simulation we have three 
candidates. s1 and s3 are not compliant to the harbor requirements 
in several stages of the trajectory, which makes it difﬁcult to deter-
mine which one is a real tug boat. The most noticeable misbehav-
iors happen at the middle of the operation, where s3 increases its 
speed over the limits allowed for the navigation channel, and at the 
end, where s1 heads to the secured facility. Simulation data in-
cludes position, size, angle and speed for each ship during 42 time 
instants (168 registers). Fig. 5 shows in detail the ship trajectories 
and labels their behavior in order of appearance.
In Fig. 6 we can see the tug boat s3 increasing its speed at t = 6
and exceeding the speed allowed for the channel. s3 accelerates at
t = [5,9], and maintains a stable speed at t = [9,13]. From t = 14, the
belief of the argument Arg1 into hypothesis ‘‘threat’’ due to speed
violation decreases, since the behavior is no longer incorrect. Sim-
ilarly, s1 accelerates at t = [36, 39] and then maintains a stable
speed increasing the value of the belief. As expected, the actual be-
lief values in these two cases are different, since the difference be-
tween the maximum allowed speed in the channel and the boat
speed is larger in the latter.
To bring the vessel to the dock, all the ships must turn left into
the overlapping area of the GCN and SCW1 channels. During thisFig. 6. Dynamics of belief in Arg1 (speed violations).maneuver, the ships are not aligned to the channels in which they 
are into. This causes an increment in the value of the beliefs into 
the argument pro ‘‘threat’’ hypothesis Arg2, corresponding to the 
violation of the navigation channel direction, at t = [13, 18], as de-
picted in Fig. 7. Later, s3 navigates against the direction of the 
SCE1 channel, which increases the value of the belief. It is also 
interesting to highlight that at the beginning of the simulation, 
s4 is simultaneously inside GCN and HSEW. For some time, s4 in-
fringes the alignment with the HSEW channel, but since it is 
aligned with the GCN channel, the value of the belief does not 
increase.
Fig. 8 shows the effects of the detected high speed of s3 to the
values of the beliefs in the arguments related to towing operations
As a result of s3 acceleration, the distance between s3 and the
towed vessel s4 increases starting at t = 20. After a while, s3 i s
not considered to be towing s4, because the distance exceeds the
maximum value to which a boat can be involved in a towing
operation. Therefore, the belief on the argument pro ‘‘threat’
Arg3 decreases because the number of tug boats of s4 is correctFig. 8. Dynamics of belief in Arg3 (number of towing boats).
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Fig. 9. Dynamics of belief in Arg4 (alignment between towing boats). Fig. 11. Dynamics of belief in ‘‘threat’’ hypothesis.when s3 is not considered a participant of the operation. A similar 
situation happens at the end of simulation, when s1 moves 
towards the LFT.
Changes in the alignment of boats with respect to channels do 
not affect very much the belief in the argument Arg4 related to 
alignment between towing boats, since boat trajectories in the 
simulation are consistent. As shown in Fig. 9, the most noticeable 
situations are the trajectory deviation by s3 t t = [17,24] and s1 
at t = [31,36]. Fig. 10, in turn, depicts the dynamics of the belief 
in the argument pro ‘‘threat’’ hypothesis related to facility perime-
ter violations. As expected, Arg5 quickly increases when s1 
approaches to the protected facility LFT.
Fig. 11 shows the overall belief into the hypothesis ‘‘threat’’. It 
depicts several situations of interest through the simulation. At 
t = 16, s4 exhibits a combination of non-compliant behaviors; 
namely, number of tug boats and alignment to channel navigation 
direction. s3, in turn, has an erratic behavior in t = [5,24], including 
violations of speed, direction alignment and tow alignment viola-
tions. Nevertheless, the evidence accumulated in favor of theFig. 10. Dynamics of belief in Arg5 (close to facility).‘‘threat’’ hypothesis does not reach enough relevance to be consid-
ered. In contrast, the threatening behavior of s1 at t = [30,42] re-
sults in triggering an alarm when it approaches the LFT area.7. Conclusions and future work
The paper has presented a system for context-based multi-level
information fusion and its application to harbor surveillance. The
system covers all processes from sensor data acquisition to threat
assessment, which require integration of different fusion levels.
This is achieved by using a common ontological model that sym-
bolically represents the heterogeneous entities and relations of
the domain. Contextual information is included into this model
in the form of deﬁnitional classes, which are used to classify enti-
ties, and deductive rules, which are used to infer discrepancies
with respect to the normal operations. In this problem, rules en-
code the restrictions deﬁned by the port authorities based on the
geometrical conﬁguration of the harbor and navigational channels.
To identify the deviations from the normalcy model that truly cor-
respond to threatening situations and avoid false alarms due to
spurious errors, the system utilizes an uncertainty reasoning meth-
od based on the Belief Argumentation System.
The example scenario and the simulation have shown the
capacities of the approach. Our system can be easily adapted to dif-
ferent harbor conﬁgurations and, which is more important, to
other application domains. It also considers the transformation
from sensor data to abstract descriptions of entities and relations,
which are dynamically integrated as part of the situational context,
and decouples the ontology-based deductive and the abductive
reasoning, which allows for a more ﬂexible conﬁguration of the fu-
sion process. Compared to other works that do not manage uncer-
tain knowledge, the number of alerts is notably reduced. The
threshold on the belief of the ‘‘threat’’ hypothesis can be adjusted
to customize the sensitivity of the system. Unfortunately, a de-
tailed comparison is not possible at this moment, because public
implementations, datasets, scenarios and criteria for the evaluation
of higher-level fusion systems are scarce, if not inexistent. The cre-
ation of such evaluation framework, a task addressed by the
ETURWG, is a prospective direction for future research.
Building a fully-deployable implementation of the system re-
quires solving several additional problems that are outside the12
scope of this paper. It is necessary to develop a better integration of
higher-level fusion processes (classiﬁcation of abnormal situations,
abductive reasoning) with lower level tasks (object detection,
tracking and identiﬁcation). This requires designing a detailed
model of inter-level procedures, including processes for quality
control and multiple feedbacks to improve the global performance
of the system. Scalability issues of the topological reasoning mod-
ule must be addressed as well. These problems can be exacerbated
by the computational complexity of the Dempster rule, which may
require the use of approximations. Applying a context selection
technique, in turn, can optimize context exploitation by allowing
the system to only search in the subset of the context model that
is relevant to the current situation. It would be also convenient
to incorporate vague knowledge into the normalcy model; e.g.
imprecise deﬁnitions of objects and zones. Last but not least, the
hypothesis generation problem has not been addressed. In that re-
gard, it would be useful to increase the interaction of the system
with human operators and decision makers in order to dynamically
create and reﬁne hypotheses.
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